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Abstract: The object of this paper is to analyse the links between income distribution and 
growth in a finance-led economy, with a post Keynesian “stock-flow” macroeconomic model. 
In fact, the increased share of financial activities creates a new macroeconomic and income 
distribution dynamic. We will use the steady-state case and simulations experiments to 
analyse model reaction to a change in financial key parameter when the wage share is 
endogenous. 
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Salaire et emploi dans une économie financiarisée 
 
Résumé : Ce papier a pour objectif d’analyser les liens entre répartition des revenus et 
croissance dans une économie financiarisée par le biais d’un modèle macroéconomique 
Postkeynésien de type « stock-flux ». L’accroissement de la part des activités financières 
s’accompagne de nouvelles dynamiques macroéconomique et de distribution des revenus. 
Nous utiliserons des simulations numériques afin d’analyser les réactions du modèle à une 
modification des variables financières dans le cadre d’une détermination endogène de la part 
des salaires. 
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Introduction 
 
The object of this paper is to analyse the links between income distribution and growth 
in a finance-led economy. To study these links, and employment, in finance-led economies, 
we will use a post Keynesian “stock-flow” macroeconomic model. This kind of model is 
developed by Godley and Lavoie (2001). These models are generally specified by a Kaleckian 
wages determination, by a mark-up rule in goods market. Here, we will introduce an 
endogenous wage determination lead by class struggle, as Goodwin (1967). We will still deal 
with a markup rule and take into account financial actors. The Goodwin model takes place in 
a classical framework, where saving affects investment and where there is no demand 
constraint. On the contrary in a Kaleckian or Keynesian framework, saving and investment 
don’t respond to the same determinants and the causal relation is reversed. So, the object of 
this paper is to introduce an endogenous wage determination in a Keynesian model, with a 
demand constraint but also with an investment financing constraint, in a finance-led economy. 
Moreover, there is no saving constraint in our model. But, money plays a central part and 
credit rationing can decrease investment. As Keynes (1937) said, a lack of liquidity can occur, 
but not of saving. Finance development affects banks behaviour and then credit access by 
modifying their liquidity preference. 
 
To consider modern finance-led economies specifications, we will introduce financial 
and credit markets but also speculative assets market, as Taylor (1991). We will present the 
model by markets in a first time. Then, we will analyse wages and employment determination 
in a finance-led economy, in comparison to this of Goodwin (1967) model. We will also see 
the relationship between income distribution and cycles in a finance-led economy, always in 
comparison to Goodwin model. Finally, we will use simulations experiments to analyse 
model reactions to a change in key parameters, and mainly a change in financial parameters. 
More precisely, we will see what the relationships between wages determination and 
economic dynamic are in a finance-led economy.  
 
1. Model presentation 
 
The model purpose is to introduce an endogenous wage determination, outside the goods 
market, as Goodwin (1967), in a post Keynesian model but also to consider finance 
CAHIERS DE LA MSE                                   Série rouge CAHIER N° R06024 
 3
development and credit rationing. For this, we will introduce financial profitability norms in 
the investment function and dividends distribution to shareholders. This last modify the 
consumption function. So, with dividends and interest payments, all profits are not invested. 
To achieve this, we will not consider the total profit share in the investment function, on 
contrary to Goodwin, but only anticipated profits linked to economic activity. Firms can 
finance their investments by issuing equities, borrowing from banks and by retained earnings. 
In this model, there are five agents: workers households, shareholders, firms, banks, and 
an external agent (foreign countries for example). It is composed by five markets: goods 
market, equities market, credit and money markets and speculative assets market. 
Accountable matrices are presented in annexes. Exponents in variables represent the demand 
(d) or the supply (s) and the indexes the agents (a for shareholders, w for workers, f for firms, 
b for banks and e for external agents). 
 
1.1. Goods market 
 
The production level is determined by aggregate demand, dds ICY +≡ . It represents the 
total income which is divided between profits and wages. This income distribution influence 
next period consumption and investment.  
 
1.1.1. Consumption function 
 
We will consider two kinds of consumers: 
wa
d CCC +=  
As Taylor (1991), we first consider wage-earning workers with a propensity to 
consume equal to one. The second part represents the shareholders. Their income is only 
constituted by dividends and interests on deposits. This is a simplification but it doesn’t really 
modify analysis results. 
 
Workers households consume wages of previous period:  
)1(−⋅= WCw α  
With 1=α . We will see in the next section how wages are set up. 
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Shareholders hold interests on deposits and dividends. In counterpart they consume 
following their propensity to consume and they save: 
)( )1()1(
d
am
d
aa MrDC −− ⋅+⋅= β  
With daD )1(− dividends received at the previous period, 
d
am Mr )1(−⋅ interest on deposits 
andβ  the propensity to consume. 
Dividends are determined following the stock of equities hold by shareholders 
households ( dae ) and the equities rate of return ( er ): 
d
ae
d
a erD )1(−⋅=  and dadada eee ∆+= − )1( , 
with s
f
s
f
e e
D
r = , dividends distributed by firms ( sfD ) on the stock of equities issued ( sfe ). 
The rate of return on deposits is exogenous, mm rr = . 
 
1.1.2. Investment function 
 
On contrary to Goodwin (1967), we will not consider that profitability affects 
investment. The profitability level is an indicator of firms’ internal financial possibilities. Yet, 
firms distribute dividends and pay interest on loans. So, retained earnings represent a better 
indicator of firms’ income than the profits share. But, these variables don’t enter in firms’ 
investment decision but in firms financing capacities. So, we will make a difference between 
firms’ investment decision according to economic activity and financial norms and 
investment financing conditions. Yet, these last can limit the investment, we will see this 
point with the credit market. 
The demand level influences the investment. Goodwin (1967) model doesn’t take into 
account the demand effect on investment, as N.Canry (2005) underlines. To analyse this 
effect, we will consider the rate of capacity utilisation, as most of post Keynesian models 
(Godley and Lavoie 2001, Taylor 1991). 
In a finance-led economy anticipated returns on investment, represented by the 
economic activity evolution, are compared with financial profitability norms and no more 
with interest rates as Keynes (1936). Because of uncertainty, past and present facts play an 
important part in firms’ decision and tend to replace anticipated events. Keynes (1936) 
developed this idea of past and present facts prevalence in investment decisions. Firms invest 
only if anticipated returns are equal to a certain norm. With financial activities development, 
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this norm is now set up on financial markets. Boyer (2000) also introduces financial norms in 
the investment function. If the anticipated return is inferior to the financial profitability norm, 
firms will not invest. High financial profitability norms create increasing investment 
selectivity. We will see later firms behaviour in the speculative asset market when investment 
opportunities are weak.  
 
We can now present the investment function: 
)1(
)2(
)1(
0
)1(
)( −
−
−
−
⋅+−∆⋅+= ub
Y
Y
ai
K
I d ρ  
With 
)2(
)1(
−
−∆
Y
Y
 economic activity fluctuations of previous period, ρ financial 
profitability norms and 
K
Yu ⋅= µ  the capacity utilisation ratio, with µ the productivity. We 
will consider equally the capital depreciation: ( ) ttt IKK +−= − δ11 , with δ the depreciation 
rate.  
 
Firms can finance their investment by retained earnings but also by issuing equities 
and contracting loans. We will see that the real investment can differ of the one established by 
the investment function. 
 
1.2. Equities market 
 
Equities are issued by firms. They finance by this mean a percentage x of their investment 
which is not covered by retained earnings ( )1(−fS ), regardless to the price of equities. This 
formulation is inspired by Godley and Lavoie (2001) and Kaldor (1966). A lag of time is 
introduced because firms set up their financing structure on previous period because of 
uncertainty: 
[ ] ( ))1()1( −− −⋅=∆ fdsf SIxe  
Retained earnings are made up by total profits minus distributed dividends ( sfD ) and 
interest rate payments on loans ( dl Lr )1(−⋅ ), plus return on speculative assets that firms can hold 
( dfz Zr )1(−⋅ ),  
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d
fz
d
l
s
fTf ZrLrDFS )1()1( −− ⋅+⋅−−=  
With WYFT −= . The rate of return on speculative assets (Z) is exogenous zz rr = . 
Distributed dividends are a percentage of previous period profits once interest ( lr ) on 
loans ( dfL ) are paid: 
( )dflTsf LrFD )1()1( −− ⋅−⋅= χ  
 
Shareholders households, banks and external agents compose the demand for equities. 
 
Shareholders households wish to acquire a certain proportion 1γ of equities with their 
saving but this proportion is modulated by the relative rates of return on equities ( )er and on 
bank deposits ( mr ) :  
[ ] ( ) ameda Srre ⋅−+=∆ 21 γγ  
With aS  their saving: a
d
am
d
aa CMrDS −⋅+= − )1(  and dadada MMM ∆+= − )1( . 
 
Banks use their unused funds with loans granted to acquire equities or speculative 
assets. They decide to purchase assets according to their liquidity preference and rates of 
return. These funds are made up by their internal saving bS  and deposits 
sM minus loans 
granted. Yet, banks can be rationed by the amount of equities issued. We will see that in this 
case they use their funds on the speculative assets market: 
 
[ ] [ ]dasfsbsbzedb eeLMSrre ∆−∆∆−∆+⋅−⋅+=∆ );()(min 43 γγ  
With sm
b
dz
d
b
s
lb MrZrDLrS )1()1()1( −−− ⋅−⋅++⋅= , dbedb erD )1(−⋅=  and dbdbdb eee ∆+= − )1( . 
 
With financial liberalization, if equities issued by firms can not be entirely got by 
banks and shareholders households, external agents complete the demand: 
d
b
d
a
s
f
d
e eeee ∆−∆−∆=∆  
 
Firms finance the rest of their investment with loans granted by banks. 
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1.3. Credit and money markets 
 
Firms decide of their investment behaviour according to the function we have seen. But, 
they can experience credit rationing due to banks behaviour. In this case, firms’ external 
financing capacities are not sufficient to fulfil the anticipated investment.  
 
To simplify, we will consider that loans demand is made up by firms only, for investment 
financing. It represents the exact counterpart of equities issue:  
[ ] )()1( )1()1( −− −⋅−=∆ fddf SIxL  
 
Banks grant loans according to their liquidity preference. In fact, they target a certain 
capital ratio which corresponds to their liquidity preference (Godley and Lavoie 2004). This 
ratio ( cC ) is composed by the ratio of banks own funds on targeted loans ( cbL ): 
c
b
bc
L
OFC =  
With db
d
b
s
b
s
bbb ZeLMSOFOF ∆−∆−∆−∆++= − )1(  and sss LLL ∆+= − )1( . We will 
consider here this ratio as exogenous. This ratio is a banks’ prudence behaviour indicator. It 
represents their confidence in the future (Lavoie 2004). Banks establish a kind of risk self-
checking. So, there is an endogenous credit supply rationing (Plihon 1998). 
 
The firms’ financial situation influences loans granted by banks. Banks estimate this 
situation taking into account the firms’ debt ratio including interest payments. As present 
situation is unknown, we introduce a lag of one period. 
 
These two components set up the loans supply: 
 
c
lcss
b
s
b C
K
rCLMS
L +
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ++⋅−∆+
=∆ −
−
1
1
)1(
)1(
 
 
So, it could have a credit rationing: ds LL ∆≤∆  
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Banks collect money deposits made by shareholders households: da
s MM ∆=∆ . Banks 
deposits represent the difference between shareholders saving and equities purchasing: 
d
aa
d
a eSM ∆−=∆  
When banks resources are higher than loans granted and equities purchased, they can 
get speculative assets. 
 
1.4. Speculative assets market 
 
As Taylor (1991), we introduce a speculative assets market. These assets can be gold, real 
estates, or external assets for example. In our case, we will take the last one. 
Asset speculative supply follows the demand and is set up by external agents: 
ds
e ZZ ∆=∆  
Speculative assets demand is composed by firms and banks. 
Firms get speculative assets when their total resources are higher than investment 
opportunities: 
[ ] ddfsffdf ILeSZ −∆+∆+=∆ − )1(  
So, their first activity is still investment but when opportunities on the goods market 
and so anticipated returns are too weak, they develop financial or speculative activities. 
 
With their unused resources, banks acquire speculative assets: 
d
b
ss
b
d
b eLMSZ ∆−∆−∆+=∆  
 
2. Wages and employment 
2.1. Wages and employment in Goodwin model 
 
In his 1967 model, Goodwin analyses the links between income distribution and 
growth. Wages are endogenous and depend on employment rate v (
N
Lv = , with L the 
employment and N the active population):  
uv
w
w +Ω−=&  
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High employment rate increases wage share and so reduces profits, which decreases 
investment and growth. With profit share decreased, growth slows down because of a higher 
financing constraint for firms. Unemployment increases and a new cycle begins.   
In Goodwin model, distributive conflicts play an important role and income 
distribution is central to analyse cycles. But, this model takes place in a classical framework 
and financial actors are not considered. As Goodwin (1967), we will introduce an endogenous 
wage share determination, taking into account distributive conflicts but with financial actors. 
We will also use a kaleckian mark up rate principle to analyse wages in a finance-led 
economy.  
 
2.2. Wages and employment in a finance-led economy 
 
Aglietta and Rebérioux (2004) and Boyer (2000) analyse the central part of corporate 
governance in finance-led economies. This principle gives an important role to shareholders 
in firms’ management decisions. Financial profitability norms become central in income 
distribution. So, to introduce shareholders strength in distributive conflict, we have to take 
these norms into account.  
The object here is to make this markup rule endogenous. In fact, in most 
postkeynesian models, the markup is an exogenous parameter and is set up only on goods 
market (Godley and Lavoie 2004, Kalecki 1990). Here, the markup rate depends on the 
difference between financial profitability norms and financial assets rate of return. This 
difference represents financial actor’s strength. So, the markup rate represents here the 
distributive conflict between agents. As Goodwin (1967), we will take the employment level 
as an indicator of workers power. Here, we will use the unemployment rate, ur, instead of the 
employment rate. So, we can write the markup rate equation: 
tet urrp πρπ +⋅−⋅=+ )(1  
When the unemployment rate increases, firms raise their markup rate and wage share 
decreases. It is the same mechanism when financial norms go up. The unemployment is 
linked to economic growth, following Okun’s law. The present equation is inspired by Dos 
Santos and Zezza (2004). The unemployment rate depends on the difference between 
economic growth and the “normal” rate of growth (Y ). This normal rate is set up by 
productivity and active population growth. Here, we will consider it as exogenous. So: 
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⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∆⋅−=
−
− t
t
t
tt YY
Yurur
1
1 ϑ  
Income distribution affects consumption and investment, and by this way economic 
growth. This last determines employment and firms profits and so, income distribution. We 
will see by simulation method the links between income distribution and growth and if a 
decrease in wage share improves firms financing capacity and so investment and growth, as 
Goodwin (1967). 
 
3. Results and experiments 
 
We have solved the model numerically and realised a series of simulation 
experiments. Two kinds of investment constraints appear. In fact, investment can be limited 
by effective demand level or by financing condition partly due to credit rationing.  
 
3.1. Cycles and income distribution 
 
With this model, we can find three economic trajectories, whatever the investment 
constraint form is. The regime can converge towards a steady-state situation, with under-
employment stability. The growth rate is close to the natural one, firms can distribute 
dividends and set up a return rate equal to financial profitability norms and so the markup rate 
is stable. Wage share and consumption can be stabilized, as investment. In this condition, the 
unemployment rate is also stationary.  
The regime can also follow a cumulative recessive trajectory. It can happen for 
example when financial profitability norms are too high. In this case, the model is marked by 
instability. Firms increase the markup rate to raise distributed dividends and so financial 
assets rate of return. Consumption and utilization rate decrease, as investment, and provokes a 
fall in firms internal saving. So, investment financing constraint increases, as demand 
constraint, and the economy follows a recessive trend.  
Finally, we can analyse a last situation, with growth cycle. But the relationship 
between income distribution and growth is not the same as Goodwin (1967) one, even when 
there is a financing constraint. In fact, if the markup rate increases (when financial 
profitability norms are higher than financial assets rate of return) and so profit share, firms 
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distribute more dividends and improve financial assets rate of return.  In parallel, growth 
slows down because of the decrease in wage share. This last provokes a fall in consumption 
and by this way in investment. Consequently, unemployment rate increases. When assets rate 
of return is equal to financial profitability norms, or higher, firms are more sensitive to 
workers demands and markup rate can decrease, even if unemployment is higher. In this case, 
we can say that wages and employment loose their central role in income distribution 
dynamics. They seem to be adjustment variables, as growth and accumulation rates. Financial 
profitability norms, distributed dividends and so financial actors occupy a central part in this 
dynamic and explain cyclic fluctuations. They represent the first determinant of the markup 
rate2. 
 
At the opposite of Goodwin, a fall in wage share doesn’t create a recovery of the 
economy by the increase of investment. On contrary, it tends to depress the activity. We can 
explain this difference by the introduction of a demand constraint. Even if the economy is 
under a financing constraint, such a reduction creates a fall in profit due to economic activity 
deceleration. So, firms’ internal saving decreases and this constraint becomes higher. The 
causality between profits and investment is reverted referring to Goodwin classical model. 
Here, we follow Kalecki’s (1966) profit and investment causality. Investment determines 
profit and not the contrary. We can replace the Goodwin relation between wages, profits and 
unemployment by a relation between financial norms, markup rate and so profits, and 
unemployment.  
 
We will see by simulations experiments how the model reacts to a change in 
parameters, and more precisely, what are the relationships between wages, financial 
profitability norms, markup rate and unemployment.  
 
3.2. Experiments on financial key parameters 
 
The experiments are led in the case of under-employment stability, when the model 
solution is stable and leads to a steady-state. First, we will see what consequences have an 
increase in financial profitability norms. Then, we will analyse a change in distributed 
                                                 
2 We have made an other scenario without the unemployment rate in the markup equation and we find 
exactly the same results 
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dividends and in the firm’s equities issuing. With the simulations method, we can only change 
a parameter at once and analyze local stability. But we can understand why the model 
generates the results given. The results figures express the economy evolution as a ratio of the 
steady-state base case. In most cases, the results between the demand constraint regime and 
the financing one are identical. In the following simulations, the regime is under a financing 
constraint.  
 
3.2.1. Changes in financial profitability norms 
 
We have seen with the investment function and the markup rate equation that financial 
profitability norms play a central part in a finance-led economy. It is one of the model key 
parameter and determines in a large part the kind of regime. In the under-employment and 
steady-state regime, an increase in financial profitability norms creates a negative effect on 
growth and accumulation rates. With the chosen parameters, the model sensibility towards a 
change in ρ  is strong and it tends quickly to a depressive state. Here, the model converges to 
a steady-state where accumulation and growth rates are less important than in the reference 
case (figure 1a). 
 
Figure 1a: growth and accumulation rates with an increase in financial profitability norms 
0,94
0,95
0,96
0,97
0,98
0,99
1
1,01
1 18 35 52 69 86 103 120 137 154 171
Accumulation rate Grow th rate
 
 
We can explain this mechanism by the increase in the markup rate which follows 
higher financial profitability norms. To fulfil financial actors demand, firms have to increase 
their markup rate in order to raise financial assets rate of return (figure 1b).  
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Figure 1b: assets rate of return, distributed dividends and markup rate with an increase in financial 
profitability norms 
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In fact, as the growth decelerates, firms’ profits decrease and the only mean to increase 
distributed dividends is to increase the markup rate. The wage share decreases (figure 1d) and 
provokes a fall in consumption and so in utilisation rate (figure 1c). Shareholders 
consumption is not sufficient to support growth when workers consumption decreases. 
Shareholders hold a lower propensity to consume and equities are equally held by foreign 
agents and banks. The equities rate of return is higher than the reference one although profits 
decrease because firms issue fewer equities with the fall in investment growth. 
 
Figure 1c: utilisation and consumption growth rates with an increase in financial profitability norms 
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Figures 1d and e:  wages share and unemployment rate with an increase in financial profitability norms 
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The investment goes down because of the utilisation rate and accelerator effect 
evolutions. The second cause is the increase of financial profitability norms. In this scenario, 
we can see that a fall in employment and wages is not followed by a recovery of the activity, 
even if the economy is under a financing constraint like here and as we have seen in the 
previous section.  
 
3.2.2. Changes in the distributed dividends ratio 
 
An increase in dividends distributed by firms has a positive effect on accumulation 
and growth rates despite a first negative shock on accumulation rate (figure 2a). It can be 
explained by the decrease in firms’ saving when the distributed dividends increase the first 
year.  
 
Figures 2a: growth, accumulation rates, and utilisation rate and consumption growth rate with an 
increase in distributed dividends ratio 
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Then, it allows reducing the difference between financial profitability norms and 
equities rate of return and so to reduce the markup rate. The first positive shock on assets rate 
of return can be explained by the lag of time between the increase in distributed dividends and 
the decrease in the markup rate. The increase in wage share is followed by a raise in the 
consumption growth rate. This last allows investment to go up. In fact, profits can increase 
and so firms internal saving (figure 2d), as distributed dividends. The financing constraint 
decreases and the markup rate can be stabilized at a lower level (figure 2c). The decrease of 
the firms’ debt ratio is a sign of their financial situation improvement (figure 2e). It leads 
banks to grant more loans. More, financial banks situation increases with new distributed 
dividends. Yet, the amount of loans follows the bank liquidity preference and can increase in 
a small proportion. With the chosen parameters, the regime is still in a financing constraint 
(the increase in firms’ saving can provoke a change in the kind of constraint). 
 
Figures 2c: assets rate of return, distributed dividends and markup rate with an increase in distributed 
dividends ratio 
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Figures 2d: ratio of none distributed profits on interests with an increase in distributed dividends ratio 
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Figures 2e: debt ratio and loans granted with an increase in distributed dividends ratio 
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So, in this scenario, we have seen that an increase of the distributed dividends share 
can have a positive effect on wages and employment by the mean of a decrease in the markup 
rate and an improvement in firms saving. Wages and employment are central to explain the 
economic growth but they follow the evolution of dividends and financial profitability norms. 
 
3.2.3. Changes in equities issuing  
 
When firms increase the investment share financed by equities, it provokes a positive 
shock in a first time. Yet, in a second time, the regime tends to a steady-state with less 
important growth and accumulation rates (figure 3a).  
 
Figures 3a: growth, accumulation rates, and utilisation rate and consumption growth rate with an 
increase in distributed equities issuing 
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The increase in equities issue by firms reduces their demand for loans in the next 
periods and so their debt ratio. It allows decreasing the investment financing constraint. The 
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investment recovery is followed by an improvement in firms’ saving, due equally to the 
decrease in interest payments on loans. Then, the evolution of firms’ financial situation leads 
banks to grant more loans and contributes by this way to the investment recovery (figure 3c). 
In addition, firms distribute more dividends with the increase in profits. So, the 
markup rate diminishes and the consumption growth rate increases, as the utilization rate 
(figure 3d).  
 
Figures 3c: debt ratio and loans granted with an increase in equities issuing 
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Figures 3d: assets rate of return, distributed dividends and markup rate with an increase in equities 
issuing 
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In a second time, the increase in equities issuing is followed by the growth of the 
equities stock. The positive effects of the shock decelerate and the equities stock begins to 
grow quicker than productive capital (figure 3e). 
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Figures 3e: equities on firms’ capital ratio with an increase in equities issuing 
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It creates a downward trend in equities rate of return and so an upward one in the 
markup rate. This is stabilized to an upper level than before the shock. So, accumulation and 
growth rates tend to a steady-state lower than before the shock. The deceleration is due to the 
negatives effects of the increase in the markup rate. Firms’ non distributed profits decrease 
and the investment financing constraint goes up again (figure 3f). 
 
Figures 3f: ratio of none distributed profits on interests with an increase in equities issuing 
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An increase in investment share financed by equities can change the constraint type 
into a demand one. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the Goodwin model, income distribution is central to analyse macroeconomic 
dynamics. More precisely, the wage share fluctuations according to the employment level 
determine endogenous cycles. The introduction of a demand constraint and of financial 
variables modifies Goodwin results.  
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First, as we have seen with model presentation, in a finance-led economy investment 
and consumption functions integrate financial variables (financial profitability norms, 
dividends…). Then, income distribution is not led any more by workers strength but by 
financial actors’ one. In this context, employment and wages seem to be adjustment variables 
and follow financial variables fluctuations (financial profitability norms, distributed dividends 
and equities rate of return…). In consequence, growth cycles hold a different nature than 
those of Goodwin model, when the model doesn’t tend to a steady-state. Financial 
profitability norms are central in cycles and macroeconomic dynamics explanation, instead of 
wages. A raise in these norms provokes a raise of the markup rate and a decrease in the 
economic activity with the fall in consumption. But, the increase in the markup rate is 
followed by the rise of equities rate of return and when financial norms are fulfilled, the 
markup can decrease and an economic recovery occurs. Even if the regime is under a 
financing constraint, a fall in wages due to markup increase doesn’t allow a recovery of 
investment. On contrary, it is followed by a growth deceleration. We can explain this 
difference by the causality between investment and profits. In our model, profits follow the 
economic activity and a decrease in the activity with the consumption slowdown provokes a 
fall in profits and not a recovery. A rise in the profit share always creates a depressive effect 
even if the regime is under a financing constraint. So, the demand level always plays a part in 
the economic dynamics, even under a financing constraint, because it is the profit source. So, 
in a finance-led economy, real wages represent the firms’ adjustment variables to reach 
financial profitability norms. This fact is analysed by Plihon (2003) for the French case for 
example. Yet, wages and employment play an important part in demand formation and so in 
macroeconomic dynamics. 
 
CAHIERS DE LA MSE                                   Série rouge CAHIER N° R06024 
 20
References 
 
Aglietta M. and A.Rebérioux (2004), Dérives du capitalisme financier, Albin Michel, Paris 
Boyer R. (2000), “Is a finance-led growth regime a viable alternative to Fordism? A 
preliminary analysis”, Economy and Society, Vol.29, n°1  
Canry N. (2005), « Régime wage-led, régime profit-led et cycles : un modèle », Economie 
Appliquée, vol. LVIII, n°1, p.143-163 
Dos Santos C.H and G. Zezza (2004), “A Post-Keynesian Stock-Flow consistent 
macroeconomic growth model: preliminary results”, The Levy Economics Institute, Working 
Paper, n°402, February  
Godley W. and M.Lavoie (2001), “Kaleckian models of growth in a coherent stock-flow 
monetary framework: a Kaldorian view”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Vol.24, n°2, 
p.101-135 
Godley W. and M.Lavoie (2004), “Feature of a realistic banking system within a post-
Keynesian stock-flow consistent model”, Working Paper n°12, mimeo 
Goodwin R.M. (1967), “A growth cycle”, in C.H. Feinstein (ed.), Capitalism and economic 
growth, Cambridge University Press, p.54-58 
Kaldor N. (1966), “Marginal productivity and the macro-economic theories of growth and 
distribution”, Review of Economic Studies, October, n°33, p.309-319 
Kalecki M. (1966), Théorie de la dynamique économique, Gauthier Villars, according to the 
second English edition (1966), Paris 
Keynes J.M. (1937), “Alternative Theories of the Rate of Interest”, The Economic Journal, 
Vol.47, n°186, p.241-252 
Lavoie M. (2004), L’économie postkeynésienne, La Découverte, Paris 
Osiatynski J. (ed.), (1990), Collected works of Michal Kalecki, volume 1, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 
CAHIERS DE LA MSE                                   Série rouge CAHIER N° R06024 
 21
Plihon D. (1998), Les banques : nouveaux enjeux, nouvelles stratégies, La documentation 
française, Paris 
Plihon D. (2003), Le nouveau capitalisme, La Découverte, Paris 
Taylor L. (1991), Income distribution, inflation and growth, MIT Press, Cambridge 
CAHIERS DE LA MSE                                   Série rouge CAHIER N° R06024 
 22 
 Workers 
households 
Firms current Firms 
capital 
Banks current Banks capital Shareholders 
households 
 
External 
agents 
∑ 
Consumption 
wC−  sC+     aC−   0 
Investment  sI+  dI−      0 
Wages W+  W−       0 
Retained earnings  - fS  + fS  - bS  + bS    0 
Interests on loans  d
l Lr )1(−⋅−   sl Lr )1(−⋅+     0 
Interests on deposits    - sm Mr )1(−⋅   + dam Mr )1(−⋅   0 
∆ loans   
dL∆+   sL∆−    0 
∆ money deposits     + sM∆  - [ ]daM∆   0 
Equities    +∆ [ ]sfe   - dbe∆  - ∆ dae  - ∆ dee  0 
Dividends distributed and 
received 
 s
fD−   dbD+   daD+  deD+  0 
Speculative assets   dfZ∆−   dbZ∆−   seZ∆+  0 
Speculative assets returns  + dfz Zr )1(−⋅   + dbz Zr )1(−⋅    - sez Zr )1(−⋅  0 
∑ 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
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 Workers Firms Banks Shareholders External 
agents 
∑ 
Money deposits   - sbM  + daM   0 
Equities  - sfe  +
d
be  + 
d
ae  + 
d
ee  0 
Speculative 
assets 
 + dfZ  +
d
bZ   -
s
eZ  0 
Capital  +K    +K 
Loans  - dfL  +
s
fL    0 
∑ (net worth) 0 K- dfL -
s
fe +
d
fZ  + bV  + aV  + eV  
